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Abstract 
 
According to a frequently cited finding by Berger et al (1993), X-inefficiency 
contributes 20% to cost-inefficiency in western banks. Empirical studies of Chinese 
banks tend to place cost-inefficiency in the region of 50%. Such estimates would 
suggest that Chinese banks suffer from gross cost inefficiency. Using a non-
parametric bootstrapping method, this study decomposes cost-inefficiency in Chinese 
banks into X-inefficiency and allocative-inefficiency. It argues that allocative 
inefficiency is the optimal outcome of input resource allocation subject to enforced 
employment constraints. The resulting analysis suggests that allowing for rational 
allocative inefficiency; Chinese banks are no better or worse than their western 
counterparts.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Bank efficiency in China has become a popular subject of research in recent years. A 
number of studies of Chinese banking efficiency have been published in Chinese 
scholarly journals1 but to date there have been only a handful of studies that are 
available to non-Chinese readers2.  The consensus of finding among Chinese scholars 
is that the state-owned commercial banks tend on average to exhibit the lowest levels 
of efficiency and the joint stock commercial banks show a faster growth in 
performance and efficiency.   
Cost inefficiency relative to 'best practice' is usually blamed on bad 
management and poor motivation. Following Leibenstein (1966) this efficiency gap is 
termed 'X-inefficiency'. In an oft cited study of bank efficiency Berger et al (1993) 
argue that 20% of bank costs is due to X-inefficiency. Recent studies of bank 
efficiency in China have estimated cost inefficiency in the region of 50%3. Such 
figures are in stark contrast to the expectations of conventional inefficiency derived 
from the Berger et al (1993) study. It implies that either Chinese bank management is 
grossly inefficient or that the estimates of cost efficiency have failed to take into 
account policy objectives and/or policy constraints that enter the decision making 
process.   
 This research has three objectives. First it aims to decompose the measure of 
cost inefficiency in Chinese banks into technical inefficiency (sometimes viewed as 
X-inefficiency), and allocative inefficiency. This paper argues that while the 
                                                 
1 For example Qing and Ou, (2001); Xu, Junmin, and Zhensheng, (2001); Wei and Wang, (2000); Xue 
and Yang, (1998) and Zhao (2000) have used non-parametric methods while Liu and Song (2004), 
Zhang, Gu and Di (2005), Sun (2005) and Qian (2003) have used parametric methods. 
2 Recent exceptions are studies using non-parametric methods by Chen et. al. (2005), and Yao et al 
(2008) and parametric methods by Fu and Heffernan (2009). Other recent studies published in English 
are, Lin and Zhang (2009), Berger et. al. (2009), Fu and Heffernen (2008), Matthews et al (2007) 
3 Fu and Heffernen (2007), Shen et al (2008), Matthews et al (2007) 
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underutilization of factors is consistent with the notion of X-inefficiency, but the 
wrong factor-mix is indicative of long-standing employment constraints imposed on 
the banking system in the pre-reform period. Insofar as allocative inefficiency can be 
explained as the result of official employment constraints, the implied cost 
inefficiency cannot be viewed as a management deficiency but a rational outcome of 
optimizing behaviour. The decomposition of cost inefficiency into X-inefficiency 
(technical inefficiency) and allocative inefficiency allows us to examine their 
evolution over the sample period.     
Second, the measures of cost inefficiency and its decomposition are obtained 
using the familiar non-parametric method of Data-Envelopment-Analysis (DEA). The 
problem with the standard DEA approach is that it does not lend itself to statistical 
inference4. This paper aims to provide an inferential capability to the point-estimates 
of inefficiency through the use of bootstrapping methods.  
Third, the bootstrap estimates of inefficiency are use to test various hypotheses 
regarding the levels, trends and convergence in X-inefficiency and allocative 
inefficiency. Over time, as the profit motive replaces other (social and economic) 
imperatives the levels of X-inefficiency and allocative inefficiency should decline. 
The opening up of the Chinese banking market and threat of entry of foreign banks 
into the Chinese market may have lead to improved management, which should result 
in improved technical efficiency and lower cost-inefficiency as incumbent banks 
attempt to cut costs and consolidate their balance sheets.   
This paper is organized on the following lines. The next section provides a 
brief motivation and discusses the model of rational allocative inefficiency. Section 3 
                                                 
4
 See Simar and Wilson (2008) 
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outlines the method, reviews the literature and discusses the data. Section 4 discusses 
the results and section 5 concludes.  
2. A model of rational allocative efficiency 
 At a first glance the Chinese banking system appears fragmented and diverse. 
In 2007 it consisted of 8,877 institutions, including 3 policy banks, 5 large state-
owned commercial banks (SOCB), 12 joint-stock commercial banks (JSCB), 124 city 
commercial banks (CCB), 29 locally incorporated foreign bank subsidiaries and the 
rest made up of urban and rural credit cooperatives and other financial institutions5. In 
contrast, its neighbour India has only 482 institutions but this includes 59 nationwide 
state-owned and private banks and 29 foreign banks. While the 28 public sector banks 
dominate the market in India with 72% of the share of assets, in China the 5 state-
owned or state-controlled banks command 53 per cent of the market6.  
Chinese banks can be characterized as historically having low return on assets 
and low net interest margins (despite having wide interest spreads), a high non-
performing loan ratio, a high cost-income ratio and overstaffed. A number of good 
descriptions of the Chinese banking system exist 7  and what follows is a brief 
statement of the elements relevant to the issue of efficiency.  
Up until 1995, control of the banking system remained firmly under the 
government and its agencies8. Under state control, the banks in China served the 
socialist plan of directing credits to specific projects dictated by political preference 
rather than commercial imperative. An important but relatively unknown feature of 
the pre-reform banking system was that the banks were compelled to employ all 
banking graduates of the universities set up by the People’s Bank of China, party 
                                                 
5 CBRC Annual Report 2007 
6
 http://www.cbrc.gov.cn (figure relates to end 2007)  
7 For example Garcia-Herreo et al (2006) 
8 According to La Porta, et. al (2002), 99% of the 10 largest commercial banks were owned and under 
the control of the government in 1995. 
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officials and retirees of the People’s Liberation Army who had completed their tour of 
duty. The overhang of Party officials and former PLA officers employed in the banks 
during the pre-reform period contributes to the overall picture of overstaffing.   
 We develop a model of allocative inefficiency based on staffing targets 
provided by the central authorities. Assume that the bank produces a single earnings 
asset (A). In reality this will consist of a combination of commercial loans, mortgages, 
government bonds, short-term bills, etc. We assume that this earning asset is produced 
by the inputs deposits (D), labour (L) and fixed capital assets )(K 9: 
 
( ) )1()1(21 βαβγγα −−−= KLLDA .    (1) 
 
The price of inputs are, the cost of deposits (r), the cost of labour (w) and the cost of 
fixed assets (ρ). The bank can hire two types of labour {L1 and L2}. The first type (L1) 
are bank workers who have a higher marginal product than the second type (L2) who 
are bureaucrats. However the bank is constrained to pay the same wage to both types 
of workers. The objective of the bank manager is to minimise costs subject to an 
output target:  
Min ( )( )AKLLDrDwLwLK −−+++ −−− )1()1(2121 βαβγγαλρ . (2) 
The bank is constrained to employ some type 2 labour but clearly in an unconstrained 
world the bank would only employ type 1 workers10. 
The solution for output in the unconstrained case is given by: 
                                                 
9 This uses the assumption of the intermediation approach that recognises that the outputs are the 
interest earning assets while deposits and borrowed funds are included with capital labour as inputs. 
See Sealey and Lindley (1977). 
10  From the FOC of (1) the ratio of the marginal products of the two types of labour is given 
by
( )
( )
1
)1( 2
1 =
− LA
LA
γ
γ
. Since this contradicts the assumption of type 1 labour having a higher 
marginal product than type 2 labour it follows that γ = 1 and L2 = 0.  
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In the constrained case, the bank has to employ a certain number of type 2 labour 
given by the central government so that 22 LL = . 
The objective function is now: 
Min ( )( ) ( )222)1()1(21121 LLAKLLDrDwLwLK −−−−+++ −−− λλρ βαβγγα  . (4) 
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The marginal wage premium for type 2 labour is given by λ2. 
The output function is now: 
  )1()1(21
βαβγβγαααα
α
γ
β
α −−−+−−






= KLLrwA .   (5) 
Denoting the input of type 1 labour in the unrestricted case as UL1 and the same for the 
restricted case as RL1 , from (5) and (3) we have the relationship described by: 
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The allocative inefficiency generated by the additional constraint in the restricted case 
is described by: 
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Expression (7) must be strictly greater than unity for an allocative inefficiency to 
exist. Because the marginal productivity of the type 2 labour is less than type 1 
labour, the type 1 labour displaced by the constraint of having to employ a fixed 
amount of type 2 labour is less than one-for-one if the target level of output (earnings 
assets) is to be maintained.  
Figure 1 describes the situation for the case of the 2 variable inputs deposits 
and labour (physical capital is fixed by assumption). The isoquant is given by qq and 
the bank cost constraint by pp. The point ‘e’ describes the cost minimum factor 
composition as in the unrestricted case which uses type 1 labour only. Point R 
describes the constrained case which uses both types of labour. The cost inefficiency 
generated by the allocative inefficiency is described by the ratio OP/OR. 
Figure 1 Rational Allocative Inefficiency 
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We can show that for any values of 21 ,,,, LL Rγβα , 1>CE
11.   
Qualitative evidence of overstaffing is scant and was gleaned from 
confidential interviews with individual bank managers. However an examination of 
the ratio of fixed assets to employees and deposits per employee at the beginning and 
end of the sample period is indicative. Table 1 shows the mean values of the ratios for 
the four large state-owned banks and the others in the sample for 1997 and 2007. 
 
Table 1: Average fixed assets per employee and deposits per employee  
Year Bank Group Fixed assets per 
employee mill rmb 
Deposits per 
employee mill rmb 
1997 
 
Big-4 0.1 6.1 
 
 
Other 0.3 14.2 
    
2007 
 
Big-4 0.2 18.4 
 
 
Other 0.4 45.3 
 
The average of fixed assets per employee has doubled for the big four and 
increased by one-third for the remainder banks over this period indicating some 
branch expansion but also reduction in staffing. However, because of the accounting 
difficulties of comparing fixed asset values over time it may be more appropriate to 
                                                 
11 Define 
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After analyzing the properties of the function ( )aCE ,,θγ  we have: (1) 1>CE ; (2)  If γβα ,, are 
fixed, then when
γ
γ
−
=
1
a , CE  achieves its minimum value 
γ
1
; (3) If we allow all 
21 ,,,, LL Rγβα  to vary, then under the following situations, CE  will approach its minimum value 1: 
(i)  0→θ , i.e., 0→β ; (ii) ∞→a ; (iii) 1→θa . 
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concentrate on the deposits per employee. Quite clearly, deposits per employee have 
tripled over the period reflecting the massive expansion in deposits in the decade to 
2007 but also the relative reduction in staffing. These figures suggest that if there was 
an allocative inefficiency in the banks in 1997, there has been a strong attempt to 
reduce it by 2007.  
A more indicative picture is gained from Chart 1 which examines the average 
$ deposit per employee of a sample of large commercial banks in the UK and that of a 
number of far-Eastern economies. We can interpret the figures for the foreign banks 
as an external benchmark. 
Chart 2: China and other economies average deposits per employee 
$ Deposits per Employee 2007-08
0
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The chart suggests that by 2007, except for the big-4 banks in China, the other banks 
in general have converged on external benchmarks as indicated by foreign banks. 
Having demonstrated that allocative inefficiency can be generated from 
rational decision making we now turn to the methodology of measuring inefficiency. 
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3. Methodology  
In reality, banks are multi-output enterprises and one of the conventional ways 
of modelling the efficiency of banks is the non-parametric method of Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA), which is the extension by Charnes et al. (1978)  
(CCR)12 of the single input-output model of Farrell (1957) to a multiple input-output 
generalisation. Technical efficiency (TE) is measured as the ratio of projected output 
(on the efficient frontier) to actual input used. There are a number of papers that 
describe the methodology of DEA as applied to banking13, and therefore will not be 
elaborated here. A diagrammatic explanation illustrates the main concepts. 
In figure 1, Technical efficiency is measured by the ratio OR/OQ (Technical 
inefficiency is given by RQ/OQ). Cost inefficiency (CI) is measured by PQ/OQ which 
in turn can be decomposed into X-inefficiency (or Technical inefficiency (RQ/OQ) 
and allocative inefficiency (PR/OQ).   
DEA constructs a non-parametric frontier of the best practices amongst the 
decision-making units (DMUs). An efficiency score for each DMU is measured in 
relation to this frontier. DEA is relatively insensitive to model specification (input or 
output orientation) and functional form14; however the results are sensitive to the 
choice of inputs and outputs. The weakness of the DEA approach is that it assumes 
data are free from measurement errors. Furthermore, since efficiency is measured in a 
relative way, its analysis is confined to the sample used. This means that an efficient 
DMU found in the analysis cannot be compared in a straightforward way with other 
DMUs outside of the sample.  
                                                 
12 Charnes et. al (1978) popularised the DEA method. According to Tavares (2002) who produces a 
bibliography of DEA (1978-2001), there are 3203 DEA authors whose studies cover a wide range of 
fields. Banxia.com also compiles DEA papers from 1978 to the present. 
13 The most recent being Drake (2004) 
14 Hababou (2002) and Avkiran (1999) provide a relatively thorough discussion of the merits and limits 
of the DEA. 
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One of the criticisms levelled at the standard DEA approach is that it produces 
estimates of efficiency but nothing can be said about the sensitivity (finite sample 
bias, confidence interval) of the estimator to sampling variation15. In a practical sense 
what this means is that if a DMU has a score of 0.95, it is 5% less efficient than the 
benchmark but nothing can be said about statistical significance – meaning is the 5% 
inefficiency statistically significant in any meaningful way. Without the capability for 
statistical inference, non-parametric methods would be weak alternatives to 
parametric methods of estimating efficiency. However, uncertainties also exist in the 
estimation of efficiency using DEA. The most obvious uncertainty is what comes 
from measurement error. Measurement error in the context of data on Chinese banks 
is particularly marked. There are three potential sources of error: firstly, differences 
between local bank's accounting procedures and those of international bodies; 
secondly, differences between local bank's accounting conventions; and thirdly, 
researcher assumptions relating to the generation of missing observations. Other 
uncertainties arise from the estimation of the efficiency frontier; changes to the inputs 
and/or outputs can cause large differences in the resulting scores. Furthermore there 
may be errors in the sampling variation caused by the difficulty in obtaining a 
sufficiently large and consistent sampling frame.  
The bootstrap procedure for non-parametric frontier models is set out in Simar 
and Wilson (1998, 2000a, 2000b). The efficiency scores calculated with the original 
data are used to construct pseudo data. The bootstrap procedure is based on the idea 
that there exists a Data Generating Process (DGP), which can be determined by 
Monte Carlo simulation. By using the estimated distribution of the DGP to generate a 
large number of random samples, a set of pseudo estimates of the efficiency scores iθˆ  
                                                 
15 Simar and Wilson (1998) 
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are obtained. However this 'naive' bootstrap yields biased and inconsistent estimates 
(Simar and Wilson, 2000a). We operate the heterogeneous bootstrap procedure that 
produces consistent values of iθˆ  from a kernel density estimate as given in Simar and 
Wilson (2000b). Briefly stated, we have observations ),( ii yx  i = 1,…,n which is 
assumed to be i.i.d. random sample from a probability density function ),( yxf  on the 
production set Ψ. The idea of the bootstrap is to first estimate ),( yxf using data 
),( ii yx . Denoting the estimated density by ),(
ˆ yxf . The next step is to randomly 
draw B samples using ),(ˆ yxf . The bootstrap can be conducted in one of two ways. 
The direct approach uses Cartesian coordinates to estimate ),(ˆ yxf  directly. This 
approach is difficult to implement and in general has not been followed by 
researchers. The indirect approach uses polar coordinates and takes the following four 
steps. 
 Step 1 Translate the Cartesian coordinate data },...,1),,{( niyx ii = into 
polar coordinate data ( ) },...,1,,,{ niyiii =ηθ , where iθˆ denotes efficiency 
and iη denotes angles. 
 Step 2 Use ( ) },...,1,,,{ niyiii =ηθ to estimate their density ),,( yf ηθ and 
denote the estimated density by ),,(ˆ yf ηθ . 
 Step 3 Randomly draw B sets of random samples from ),,(ˆ yf ηθ . 
Denote the bth bootstrap sample by ( ){ }niyibibib ,...,1,,, *** =ηθ . 
 Step 4 Translate the bth bootstrap sample ( ){ }niyibibib ,...,1,,, *** =ηθ  into 
Cartesian coordinate data ( ){ }niyx ibib ,...,1,, ** = . 
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The difference between the homogeneous bootstrap and the heterogeneous bootstrap 
appears in step 1. The homogeneous bootstrap method assumes that the distribution of 
efficiency }{θ is unrelated to the distribution of ),( yη . That is ( ) ( )θηθ fyf =, . The 
heterogeneous bootstrap does not maintain this assumption. Following the Simar-
Wilson method, 1000 bootstrap values of the individual DMU for the efficiency 
scores are generated in each year 16 . The appendix provides a description of the 
algorithm. 
Most studies of banking efficiency have focussed on the developed 
economies17. While there have been some studies of other Far Eastern economies18, 
the number is small in comparison. Indeed, from Berger and Humphrey's (1997) 
survey of 130 studies of frontier analysis in 21 countries, only 8 were about 
developing and Asian countries (including 2 in Japan). Studies on US financial 
institutions were the most common, accounting for 66 out of 116 single country 
studies. 
A number of efficiency studies of Chinese banks have emerged in recent 
years, using both DEA and stochastic frontier analysis19. The consensus of finding 
from the DEA studies is threefold. First, because of the continued banking reform 
programme technical inefficiency has been declining over time. Second, average bank 
efficiency is lower in the state owned banks (SOBs) than in the joint stock banks. 
Third, the gap between the two has been narrowing in recent years.  
                                                 
16 Recent bootstrapping applications to DEA have been conducted by Löthgren and Tambour (1999); in 
the case of banking efficiency by Casu and Molyneux (2003); and in the case of Chinese rural credit 
cooperatives, Dong and Featherstone (2006). 
17 See for example Drake and Hall (2003), Cavallo and Rossi (2002), Elyasiani and Rezvanian (2002), 
Maudos et al. (2002), Drake (2001) Altunbas and Molyneux (1996) and Molyneux and Forbes (1993) 
18See Rezvanian and Mehdian (2002), Hardy and di Patti (2001), Karim (2001), Laevan (1999), Katib 
and Matthews  (1999), Chu and Lim (1998), Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) and Fukuyama (1995) 
19 In addition to the papers cited in footnote 1, other studies by Chinese scholars that have used non-
parametric techniques include Fang et. al. (2004) and studies using parametric methods include Liu and 
Liu (2004), Sun (2005), Qian (2003), Chi, Sun and Lu (2005), Yao, Feng and Jiang (2004)  
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Studies of bank efficiency have used the terms technical efficiency and X-
efficiency interchangeably as if they were the same thing. While similar in concept 
they are not necessarily the same. The concept of technical efficiency derives its basis 
in the neo-classical theory of the firm and assumes profit maximising behaviour. A 
firm or a bank may be technically inefficient for technical reasons such as low 
training or low human capital levels of managers and workers, or the use of inferior or 
out-of-date technology. The diffusion of new technology is not instantaneous and 
some firms or banks may lag behind others in the acquisition and utilisation of new 
technology. With further training and updating of capital, the firm or bank can expect 
to move towards the efficient frontier described by the isoquant in Figure 1. X-
inefficiency is not caused by the variability of skills or the time variability of 
technology diffusion but by the use and organisation of such skills and technology. 
Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993) argue that X-inefficiency constitutes 20% 
or more of bank costs. Poor motivation and weak pressure resulting in under 
utilization of factors of production are parts of what Leibenstein (1975) describes as 
‘organisational entropy’. X-inefficiency arises as a result of low pressure for 
performance. Some institutions would be protected by government regulation that 
would reduce the external pressure of competition. But even with a higher degree of 
pressure from the environment, firms may have organisational deficiencies so that 
management signals and incentives are lost in the hierarchy of the organisation. 
This study employs annual data (1997-2007) for 14 banks: the five state-
owned banks (SOB), and nine joint-stock commercial banks (JSB). The total sample 
consisted of 154 bank year observations. The main source of the data was 
Fitch/Bankscope, and individual annual reports of banks. The choice of banks was 
based on the fact that they face a common market and compete nationwide.  
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Two approaches are normally taken in determining what constitutes bank 
input and output. Under the intermediation approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977), bank 
assets measure outputs and liabilities measure inputs.  In contrast, inputs in the 
production approach are physical entities such as labour and physical capital and 
revenue flows represent outputs. In this study, we adopt a hybrid of the two 
approaches. We use three inputs and three outputs for the estimation of technical 
efficiency. Inputs are the number of employees (LAB), fixed assets (FA) and total 
deposits (DEP). Outputs are total loans (LOANS), other earning assets (OEA), and 
non-interest income (NII). Although the latter variable remains undeveloped in China, 
it is selected to reflect the growing contribution of non-interest income to banks’ total 
income.  
The inputs for the construction of cost-efficiency additionally require the 
factor prices of the relevant inputs above. We distinguish between the price of labour 
(PL), price of fixed capital (PK) and the price of funds (PF). The price of labour is 
obtained as the ratio of personnel expenses to the number of employees. The price of 
fixed capital is obtained as operating expenses less personnel expenses divided by 
fixed assets (less depreciation). The price of funds is obtained from the ratio of 
interest paid to total funds. 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the input and output data for 1997 
and 2007 as a snapshot indicator of the scale of the variables used. The high standard 
deviation is an indication of the dominance of the 5 state owned banks. The table 
shows how fast earnings assets have grown over this period. The total stock of loans 
has grown at an average of 12 per cent a year. Other earning assets have grown at an 
average rate of 20% a year, in part reflecting the activities of the asset management 
companies that swapped tranches of the NPLs of the big 4 SOBs for bonds in 1999 
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and 2001. The most remarkable growth is in non-interest earnings which have grown 
at an average rate of 28% a year, reflecting an increasing source of profit for banks 
that have traditionally depended on the banking book for the generation of income.   
Table 2: Output-Input Variables 1997 - 2007 (million RMB) 
Variable 
 
Description Mean 1997 SD 1997 Mean 2007 SD 2007 
LOANS 
RMB mill 
Total stock 
of loans 
430033 657201 1296424 1351614 
OEA 
RMB mill 
Investments 
 
205103 301626 1227591 1419119 
NII 
RMB mill 
Net Fees and 
Commissions 
862 1922 9994 12851 
LAB Total 
Employed 
105138 175233 111960 157645 
DEP 
RMB mill 
Total stock 
of Deposits 
604013 891353 2309760 2568177 
FA 
RMB mill 
Fixed assets 
 
12831 19398 27374 33704 
PL Unit price of 
labour 
.0631 .0380 .2353 .0915 
PF Unit price of 
funds 
.0502 .0202 .0214 .0057 
PK Unit price of 
fixed assets 
.6528 .5282 .7409 .2333 
 Sources: Fitch/Bankscope and author calculations from web sources. 
  
Other points to note are that net employment has grown by an average of 0.6% 
a year but average labour cost has grown by a remarkable 14% a year, reflecting the 
increasing skill premium paid to workers in this sector. A further point to note is 
reduced relative dispersion of the variables (coefficient of variation) which also 
indicates an increased convergence of the nationwide banks on each other. 
Having outlined the methodology and the data we now examine the empirical 
results from the bootstrap method. 
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4.0 Empirical Results 
Tables 3a-b illustrate the results of the bootstrap method for two representative 
years; 1997 and 2007 in the case of technical efficiency (X-efficiency, XE) and cost 
efficiency (CE). The tables show the biased estimates, the bootstrapped bias-adjusted 
estimates and the 95% confidence intervals for 2000 bootstraps. 
Simar and Wilson (2000a, 2000b) show that the bias correction will introduce 
extra noise that may result in a mean-square error (MSE) greater than the MSE of the 
bias-unadjusted bootstrap values. In the limit the bias corrected MSE will be four 
times that of the uncorrected estimate and  Simar and Wilson caution against the bias 
correction unless the ratio 







2
2
3
1
ˆ
ˆ
σ
sbia
 is greater than unity, where sbiaˆ  is the bias 
correction and 2σˆ  is the sample variance of the uncorrected bootstrap values. The 
statistic iρ is defined as 






=
2
2
3
1
ˆ
ˆ
σ
ρ
sbia
i  and is shown in the final column. A statistic of 
1>iρ  implies that the bias correction is valid. 
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Table 3a: Median Bootstrap Estimates of Cost efficiency 1997 & 2007 CRS 
Bank Efficiency 
Score 
Bias 
corrected 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
ρ 
1997 
ABOC .7941* 0.4856 0.4212 0.5683 22.9 
BOC .9502* 0.6942
# 
0.1441 0.8789 0.64 
BCOMM .9154* 0.3099 -.1241 0.6710 2.79 
CCB .8938* 0.7606 0.7069 0.7863 11.3 
ICBC 1.000* 0.4158 0.0362 0.7490 2.86 
CITIC 1.000* 0.4425 0.0381 0.8305 2.17 
CMB 1.000* 0.5093 0.0559 0.7882 2.10 
CMBCL 1.000* 0.6721 0.2203 0.8547 1.37 
EVERBRT 1.000* 0.5537 0.2113 0.6604 1.75 
GDB .8325* 0.5242 0.0507 0.8457 1.73 
HUAXIA 1.000* 0.3325 0.0191 0.7127 3.99 
IBCL 1.000* 0.8518 0.7406 0.9442 2.64 
SDB .8409* 0.6142 0.5430 0.6782 9.08 
SPB 1.000* 0.2533 0.0162 0.6641 5.88 
 
2007 
ABOC .6848* 0.1851 0.1095 0.3288 25.8 
BOC .8578* 0.6725 0.5419 0.7138 5.25 
BCOMM .7737* 0.4566 0.3745 0.5412 14.6 
CCB .8250* 0.5929 0.4190 0.6472 4.81 
ICBC .8200* 0.7056 0.3610 0.8566 1.14 
CITIC .9451* 0.7630 0.4132 0.9078 1.06 
CMB .9962* 0.6674 0.3918 0.8560 2.55 
CMBCL 1.000* 0.6691 0.3750 0.8294 1.91 
EVERBRT .9536* 0.6771 0.4342 0.7768 1.81 
GDB .8922* 0.6452 0.3744 0.8284 2.00 
HUAXIA .9293* 0.6268 0.3374 0.8359 2.93 
IBCL 1.000* 0.5846 0.5024 0.6370 12.5 
SDB 1.000* 0.6426 0.2745 0.8274 2.07 
SPB .9712* 0.7057
# 
0.2856 0.8835 0.98 
* significant bias at the 95% level of confidence. # Bias correction invalid 
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Table 3b: Median Bootstrap Estimates of Technical efficiency 1997 & 2007 CRS 
Bank Efficiency 
Score 
Bias 
corrected 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
ρ  
1997 
ABOC 0.8914* 0.9809 0.7671 0.8803 1.07 
BOC 1.0000* 0.8304 0.6119 0.7796 9.12 
BCOMM 1.0000* 0.6889 0.5804 0.7624 9.95 
CCB 0.9699* 0.6430 0.8521 0.9572 1.13 
ICBC 1.0000* 0.9109 0.5887 0.7397 13.2 
CITIC 1.0000* 0.6500 0.6122 0.8156 6.50 
CMB 1.0000* 0.6882 0.6056 0.7821 8.21 
CMBCL 1.0000* 0.6801 0.5844 0.7292 14.8 
EVERBRT 0.8932* 0.6423 0.6028 0.8058 2.69 
GDB 1.0000* 0.7007 0.6056 0.8060 6.79 
HUAXIA 1.0000* 0.6822 0.5516 0.7370 10.0 
IBCL 1.0000* 0.6152 0.7097 0.9079 2.64 
SDB 0.9809* 0.8165
# 
0.7755 0.9530 0.89 
SPB 1.0000* 0.8925 0.5692 0.6922 19.9 
 
ABOC 0.9088* 0.8274 0.7543 0.8715 1.92 
BOC 1.0000* 0.8744 0.7879 0.9283 2.76 
BCOMM 0.9033* 0.8080 0.7200 0.8539 1.80 
CCB 1.0000* 0.8749 0.7719 0.9515 1.58 
ICBC 1.0000* 0.7431 0.6421 0.8580 3.81 
CITIC 1.0000* 0.7836 0.6703 0.8881 2.89 
CMB 1.0000* 0.7521 0.6695 0.8547 5.39 
CMBCL 1.0000* 0.7555 0.6671 0.8677 4.33 
EVERBRT 0.9415* 0.7863 0.6912 0.8659 2.63 
GDB 0.9796* 0.7443 0.6425 0.8839 2.95 
HUAXIA 1.0000* 0.7017 0.6277 0.8093 7.66 
IBCL 0.9726* 0.9000
# 
0.7989 0.9423 0.97 
SDB 1.0000* 0.7518 0.6669 0.8363 5.77 
SPB 1.0000* 0.7469 0.6410 0.8673 3.33 
* significant bias at the 95% level of confidence. # Bias correction invalid 
 
The Tables report the median of the 2000 bootstrap values of cost efficiency 
(CE) and X-efficiency (Technical efficiency) (XE) as the standard for previous 
studies20. The confidence intervals of the bootstrap values in Table 2a-b support the 
                                                 
20 See for example Dong and Featherstone (2006). The argument for reporting the median rather than 
the mean is that the distribution of the efficiency scores may not be standard normal. In reality there 
was little difference between the two. 
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significance of the bias. The value of ρ indicates the validity of the bias correction 
which in all cases was always one-sided21.  
We now turn to the third objective of this paper and that is to evaluate the 
levels, tends and convergence in the two types of inefficiency. Table 4 shows the full 
period sample means and weighted means of the cost inefficiency (CI) and X-
inefficiency (XI) estimates obtained as CI = (1 – CE) and XI = (1 – XE) respectively. 
The allocative inefficiency estimate was obtained as the residual of the cost 
inefficiency CI and X-inefficiency XI (AI = CI – XI)22. 
 
Table 4: Mean inefficiency 1997 - 2007 
Statistic Cost-inefficiency X-inefficiency Allocative -  
Inefficiency 
Mean all 55.0 30.4 24.6 
    
Weighted mean 50.5 25.9 24.6 
    
Mean SOB 52.9 25.9 27.0 
    
W - mean SOB 50.1 25.1 25.1 
    
Mean JSCB 55.0 30.4 24.6 
    
W – mean JSCB 55.2 30.8 24.4 
 
 
 Weighting the inefficiency scores provide a more accurate picture of the 
average levels of inefficiency but in reality the difference between the pure average 
and the weighted average is of second-order magnitude. It can be seen from Table 4 
that the weighted average cost inefficiency over the period for the SOCBs is slightly 
smaller than the average for the JSCBs. The table also indicates that the weighted 
average allocative inefficiency is comparable for both groups of banks.  
                                                 
21 Out of 154 bootstrap results for each bank-year in only seven cases was the bias correction invalid. 
In such cases the bootstrap value was used for consistency. 
22 Strictly AE = CE/XE but as we are dealing with the median values of an unknown distribution it was 
convenient to define AI = CI-XI = XE-CE. The alternative measure is AI*=(1-AE)=(XE-CE)/XE. 
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Using the mean of the un-weighted scores, we test if there is a significant 
difference between the average inefficiency of banks that have a foreign stakeholding 
from those that do not. Since the distribution of the inefficiency scores may not be 
standard normal we apply a non-parametric test (Mann-Whitney) with the results 
shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Non-parametric test for difference in means 
Statistic 
 
X-inefficiency Allocative inefficiency 
Mean (Foreign stake) 
 
24.5 13.9 
Mean (all other) 
 
30.1 29.1 
Z – statistic 
 
4.15*** 5.55*** 
 
The results of the non-parametric tests indicate a significant difference. Banks 
that have a foreign stake-holding have lower average X-inefficiency and allocative 
inefficiency. But is inefficiency in Chinese banks as a whole declining and if so can 
anything be said about the speed at which the inefficient banks are converging on the 
benchmark efficient banks?  Chart 2 and 3 show the yearly weighted average 
technical inefficiency and allocative inefficiency for the SOCBs and JSCBs as a 
group. The short dotted line is the weighted average measure of inefficiency for the 
SOCBs and the long dotted line is the same for the JSCBs. Chart 2 shows a rise in 
technical inefficiency in the years 1999-2001 which roughly coincides with the 
activities of the Asset Management Companies that transferred tranches of NPLS of 
the big 4 SOCBs and returned them as face value bonds in 1999-200023.  
 
 
                                                 
23 During 1999-2000 4 AMCs bought up an aggregate of roughly $205 billion in NPLs in return for 10-
year bonds paying a fixed rate of 2.25% 
  
22 
22 
Chart 2 
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Chart 3 
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 It is possible that the portfolio switch of the NPLs from the loan book to other 
earning assets of the big-4 balance sheets distorted the average efficiency measure for 
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the SOCBs. However, this explanation is less convincing for the JSCBs which show a 
similar pattern for the allocative inefficiency in Chart 3. Also the asset management 
companies conducted a further transfer of NPLs from the big-4 banks of around $120 
billion in 2003 which does not appear to have affected the average inefficiency 
figures as seen in the charts. But what is clear is that there is a discernible negative 
trend in both types of inefficiency for both groups of banks.  
Using the concept of beta-convergence from the growth convergence literature 
(Barro, 1991), we can obtain a measure of the speed of convergence to a common 
level of inefficiency by regressing the change in the level of inefficiency on the lag of 
inefficiency and environmental and bank specific variables to allow for convergence 
to different levels of inefficiency24. However it is shown by Simar and Wilson (2007) 
that the estimated inefficiencies may be serially correlated. They propose a double 
bootstrap procedure to adjust for the bias caused by the inherent correlation among 
the estimated inefficiencies. The problem of potential bias is further compounded by 
the existence of the lagged inefficiency score. Developing a valid bootstrap procedure 
for estimating beta-convergence is computationally intractable. However in an 
attempt to deal with the potential serial correlation we present estimates of the rate of 
decline of inefficiency controlled for individual bank factors using a panel GLS 
Heteroskedastic-Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) estimator (Table 6). The 
dependant variable was the yearly change in the specific type of inefficiency.  Bank 
specific variables were lagged one period to avoid potential endogeneity. 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 See also Fung (2006) 
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Table 6: Panel GLS (Panel heteroskedastic-autocorrelation consistent estimates). 
Dependant Variable is the year-on-year change in inefficiency. P values in 
parenthesis 
Variable Change in X-inefficiency = ΔXIt 
(observations = 140) 
Change in Allocative inefficiency 
= ΔAIt (observations = 140) 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Intercept 0.353*** 
(.000) 
.354*** 
(.000) 
.354*** 
(.000) 
.923*** 
(.000) 
.567*** 
(.000) 
1.01*** 
(.000) 
XIt-1 -.444*** 
(.000) 
-.485*** 
(.000) 
-.447*** 
(.000) 
 - - 
AIt-1 - - - -.617*** 
(.000) 
-.735*** 
(.000) 
-.704*** 
(.000) 
SOB .021** 
(.035) 
- .020** 
(.036) 
.173*** 
(.000) 
- .137*** 
(.000) 
SOB* XIt-1 - .055** 
(.049) 
.004** 
(.036) 
- - - 
SOB* AIt-1 - - - - .375*** 
(.000) 
.202** 
(.002) 
ln(TA)t-1 -.018*** 
(.000) 
-.017*** 
(.000) 
-.018*** 
(.000) 
-.062*** 
(.000) 
-.031*** 
(.000) 
-.068*** 
(.000) 
FOR -.001*** 
(.000) 
-.001*** 
(.000) 
-.001*** 
(.000) 
-.003*** 
(.000) 
-.004*** 
(.000) 
-003*** 
(.000) 
L* 1021.7 1037.2 1041.5 
 
891.6 898.0 898.1 
F1,13 42.6*** 
 
48.4*** 48.4*** 27.7*** 39.3*** 39.3*** 
2
13χ  100.2*** 100.2*** 100.2*** 22.0* 21.7* 21.6* 
*** significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5%, * significant at the 10%.   
 
 
The key covariate is the lag in the level of inefficiency. A negative coefficient 
defines the common speed of convergence of inefficiency. The bank specific variable 
that proved significant was the logarithm of total assets as a measure of size. 
Environmental variables were a zero-one dummy variable identifying SOCBs (SOB) 
and the proportion of the bank owned by foreign financial enterprises (FOR). An 
interaction term between the lag in inefficiency and the SOB dummy defined differing 
speed of adjustment between SOCBs and JSCBs. The third but last row is the log 
likelihood. The second but last row is an F test for autocorrelation in panel data 
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(Wooldridge, 2002) and the final row is a likelihood ratio test for heteroskedasticity in 
panel data.  
 
The last two rows of Table 6 indicate that the use of the HAC estimator was 
appropriate. Autocorrelation in the panel could not be rejected at the 1% level for the 
regressions of both types of inefficiency, and heteroskedasticity could not be rejected 
at the 1% for the X-inefficiency and 10% for allocative inefficiency regressions.  
The results of Table 6 indicate that controlling for ownership, larger banks are 
associated with lower levels of both types of inefficiency. Banks that have a foreign 
stake are associated with lower levels of both types of inefficiency, confirming the 
finding reported in Table 4. State-owned banks are associated with higher levels of 
both types of inefficiency and in particular higher levels of allocative inefficiency. 
Importantly, the negative coefficient on the lagged measure of inefficiency shows 
significant decline in both measures of inefficiency. The interaction term of lagged 
inefficiency with SOB suggests that the state-owned banks reduce inefficiency at a 
lower speed than the JSCBs25, but that they are reducing both types at roughly the 
same speed. The results suggest that the joint-stock commercial banks are reducing 
allocative inefficiency at a faster rate than X-inefficiency. 
 
7.0  Conclusion   
This paper has used non-parametric methods to conduct an analysis of 
inefficiency in a sample of Chinese banks. The estimates of bank inefficiency were 
obtained using a bootstrapping method to enable statistical inference. We have 
partitioned cost inefficiency into X-inefficiency and allocative inefficiency. Our 
                                                 
25  Because of the problem of multi-collinearity between SOB and the interaction term in the X-
inefficiency regression, a grid search using constrained estimates that maximised the log likelihood is 
reported in Model (3) of Table 5. 
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findings suggest that Chinese banks have been improving performance by reducing 
both types of inefficiency. However, the state-owned banking sector has higher levels 
of both types of inefficiency and is also reducing both types of inefficiency at a 
slower rate than joint-stock commercial banks. This suggests that state-owned banks 
are more constrained by social and political objectives in their downsizing strategy 
than JSCBs. 
We confirm the findings from nonparametric and stochastic frontier based 
studies of Chinese banks that average cost inefficiency are in the region of 50%. 
Inefficiency in Chinese banking is made up of both X-inefficiency and allocative 
inefficiency. We have argued in this paper that given the social and political 
constraints that Chinese banks had to operate in, allocative inefficiency was 
symptomatic of rational decision making dictated by social employment objectives.   
However, we must still interpret the results with caution. Not all of allocative 
inefficiency can be attributed to over-staffing and not all of over-staffing can be 
explained by past employment objectives. Overstaffing caused by political and social 
constraints is observationally equivalent to rent-seeking behaviour by bank managers 
(Matthews et al, 2007). It is also possible that poor management decisions that may 
have contributed to X-inefficiency could also have contributed to allocative 
inefficiency.   
Yet, the argument of this paper is that there have been significant 
improvements in bank efficiency. The 2007 weighted average of all banks X-
inefficiency and allocative inefficiency is 16% and 20% respectively. If the Berger et 
al (1993) finding that 20% of all bank costs are due to X-efficiency represents a 
common benchmark for banking markets in general then the message of this paper is 
that Chinese banks are not out of line.  
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Appendix 
The heterogeneous bootstrap algorithm 
In this paper, we implement the heterogeneous bootstrap algorithm of Simar and 
Wilson (2000b) to compute the bias-corrected technical efficiency and cost efficiency 
scores. Specifically, we follow the following steps: 
Note: In our application 3,3,14 === qpn . 
Step 1. Compute the technical efficiency scores using the original data. To be 
consistent with Simar and Wilson (2000b), we denote these technical efficiency 
estimates by ( ) niyx iiii ,,1,,ˆˆ ⋅⋅⋅== δδ . The iδˆ s are computed using the linear 
programming described in equation (17) of Simar and Wilson (2000). Note that by 
definition, nii ,,1,1
ˆ ⋅⋅⋅=∀≥δ . 
Step 2. For each ni ,,1 ⋅⋅⋅= , translate the data ( )ii yx ,  into its polar coordinate 
representation ( )iiiy δη ˆ,,  by defining ( )21 , iii ηηη =  as (1) 2,1,
2
=∀= kik
π
η , if 
01 =ix ; and (2) 2,1,arctan 1 =∀



= + k
x
x
k
k
ikη , if 01 >ix . Define matrices Z and RZ  
by letting their thi  row be ( )iiiii yyy δη ˆ,,,, 321  and ( )iiiii yyy δη ˆ2,,,, 321 −  respectively. 
Define matrices 1Z and 1RZ  by letting their 
thi  row be ( )iiiii yyy δη ˆ,,,, 321−  and 
( )iiiii yyy δη ˆ2,,,, 321 −−  respectively. Define matrices 2Z , 2RZ , 3Z and 3RZ similarly. 
Define matrices 12Z and 12RZ  by letting their 
thi  row be ( )iiiii yyy δη ˆ,,,, 321 −−  and 
( )iiiii yyy δη ˆ2,,,, 321 −−−  respectively. Define matrices 13Z , 13RZ , 23Z and 
23RZ similarly.  
Define matrices 123Z and 123RZ  by letting their 
thi  row be ( )iiiii yyy δη ˆ,,,, 321 −−−  and 
( )iiiii yyy δη ˆ2,,,, 321 −−−−  respectively. For simplicity we rename the above 16 
matrices as 1621 ,,, ZZZ ⋅⋅⋅  respectively. Form the augmented 616 ×n  
matrix










⋅⋅⋅=
16
1
~
Z
Z
Z .  
Step 3. Compute the estimated covariance matrices of 16,,1, ⋅⋅⋅=kZ k . Denote them 
by 16,,1,ˆ ⋅⋅⋅=Σ kk respectively. Obtain the upper triangular matrices 16,,1, ⋅⋅⋅=kLk  
through Cholesky decomposition: 'ˆ kkk LL=Σ . 
Step 4. Choose an appropriate bandwidth as suggested by Simar and Wilson (2000). 
We use the normal reference rule for its simplicity. This choice was also supported by 
Simar and Wilson’s (2000b) simulation study. 
Step 5. Draw n rows with replacement from Z
~
 to form a new ( )qpn +×  matrix *~Z . 
Denote the row means of *
~
Z  by *z . The dimension of *z  is 1×n . 
Step 6. Generate an ( )qpn +×  random matrix ε  such that its entries are i.i.d. 
standard normal random variates. Denote its thi row by iε . Construct a new ( )qpn +×  
matrix *ε  by defining its thi row kii Lεε =
*
, if the thi row of *
~
Z  was drawn from kZ .   
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Step 7. Define the ( )qpn +×  matrix Γ  by  
( ) ***
2
~
1
1
zlhZM
h
n ⊗++
+
=Γ ε , 
where nl  is the 1×n  vector of ones, and '
1
nnn ll
n
IM −= , with nI  the identity matrix 
of order n, and ⊗ the Kronecker product. 
Step 8. Denote the thi row of Γ by iγ , with ( )321 ,, iiii γγγγ = , where 1iγ  is q-
dimensional, 2iγ  is (p-1)-dimensional, and 3iγ  is 1-dimensional. Construct an 
( )qpn +×  matrix *Z  by defining its thi row ( )*3*2*1* ,, iiii zzzz =  as  
                        
( )
( )


−
≥
=
otherwise2,,
1 if,,
321
3321*
iii
iiii
iz γγγ
γγγγ
 
The so-constructed *Z  is the bootstrap data in polar coordinate. 
Step 9. Translate the polar coordinate data *Z back to Cartesian coordinate data 
( ){ }niyxX ii ,,1,, *** ⋅⋅⋅== . Specifically, let *1* ii zy = , *2* ii z=η , *3* ii z=δ , and define ix~  
by ( )*1 tan~,1~ ikiki xx η== , 1,,1 −⋅⋅⋅= pk . Define ( ) iiii
i
i x
yx
x ~
,~ˆ *
*
*
δ
δ
= . *X is our bootstrap 
sample data. Repeat Step 5-8 if the linear programming of obtaining ( )*,~ˆ iii yxδ  has no 
solution. 
Step 10. For a given point ( )ii yx , , using the bootstrap data *X  as the reference data 
to compute the technical efficiency score ( )ii yx ,ˆ*δ  and cost efficiency score 
( )ii yx ,ˆ*ϑ  (along with the data for inputs prices). We use model (7) in Jahanshahloo 
et al. (2008) to compute the cost efficiency score ( )ii yx ,ˆ*ϑ .  
Step 11. Repeat Steps 5-10 B times. We obtain B bootstrap technical efficiency 
estimates ( ) ( )( ){ }Bbyxyx nnbb ,,1,,ˆ,,,ˆ *11* ⋅⋅⋅=⋅⋅⋅ δδ  and B bootstrap cost efficiency 
estimates ( ) ( )( ){ }Bbyxyx nnbb ,,1,,ˆ,,,ˆ *11* ⋅⋅⋅=⋅⋅⋅ ϑϑ . 
Step 12. Compute the bias-corrected estimates of technical efficiency and cost 
efficiency, and bootstrap confidence intervals.   
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